category theory


Well, a week ago I got back from England, where I spent a week at the University of Nottingham at the conference “Quantum Gravity and Quantum Geometry 2008″, and a weekend visiting friends in London. London was enjoyable, though surprisingly expensive. It’s strange, when so many things are traded globally, that prices differ so much from place to place - the standard rule being to imagine that all prices in Pounds are actually in dollars, and they seem quite familiar. Clearly not everything is affected by trade, with restaurant meals among them. In any case, it was quite interesting to come come from London, Ontario to London, England, and walk around all the places whose names show up attached to completely dissimilar landmarks in the Canadian version.

As for the conference, it was a great experience. This was an outgrowth of the “LOOPS” series of conferences. The only one of those I’d been to previously was LOOPS ‘05 at the Albert Einstein Institute, in Germany. At that time the conference was a little more focused on some particular approaches to quantum gravity (though there was still a whole range of talks). This year, there seemed to have been some attempt to broaden the conference a little - one result being that there must have been about 200 people attending, with something on the order of 90 talks, most of them half-hour talks in the parallel sessions. As a result, I saw less than half of what was going on. However, there were some broad subject areas, such as loop quantum gravity, spin foam and combinatorial quantization, noncommutative geometry, quantum groups, as well as some less readily classifiable talks.

In one talk on the first day, Carlo Rovelli discussed the relation between the Loop Quantum Gravity and spin-foam approaches to a theory of 4D quantum gravity. In particular, he was talking about the fact that the two approaches agree with each other in 3D, but it’s not so clear they do in 4D - or at least, it’s not clear what the spin foam model is that does this in 4D. This is part of what’s behind the program to improve the Barrett-Crane spin foam model for 4D gravity. It has various technical problems as well, which various more technical talks got into in more detail later in the conference. Rovelli was describing work on the new models which agree with LQG. Various other people have done work on this, including (among others) Freidel (who talked about that in his own talk later) and Krasnov, and Engle, Pereira and Rovelli. Florian Conrady also talked about these new models later on. I know Igor Khavkine, just graduating here at Western, has also done some work on these.

Another talk based off the successes of these models was by Abhay Ashtekar, about Loop Quantum Cosmology - that is, applying loop QG methods to the universe as a whole - a quantum version of the Friedman-Robertson-Walker universe. What’s interesting about this is that they’re doing numerical and analytic simulations, and predicting something that otherwise has usually been added as a “what-if” afterthougoht. Namely, such a universe behaves a lot like classical FRW, except near the “big bang”, classically a singularity, where quantum geometric effects prevent that from happening. Continuing through the other side, one sees a collapsing universe - an overall “bounce” effect. An interesting prediction, if hard to check.

In any case, I was bombarded by a whole range of other talks on other points of view. Starting from the very first talk, by Vincent Rivasseau, there were several talks presenting noncommutative geometry, Alain Connes-style, as a setting for a quantum theory of gravity. There’s certainly an appeal to the idea of replacing measure-theoretic and topological information about spacetime with a quantum algebra of observables - just write the theory in quantum terms from the start, giving up the usual differential geometry for its noncommutative version. Rivasseau presented, among other things, the idea of QFT as weighted species, in the sense of Joyal’s combinatorial species. I thought this was great, since I looked at just that idea for the simplest QFT of all, the quantum harmonic oscillator.

(Speaking of which, I had some interesting conversations with Jamie Vicary in which I finally “got” part of what he did with his own paper about the oscillator - which is to show how “taking Fock space” for a quantum system is a monad, namely the monad associated with the “free commutative monoid” functor, and its adjoint.)

Shahn Majid, whom I knew as the author of some well-known books on quantum groups, also spoke about this C*-algebra approach to geometry, and quantum gravity. : begin with a space, like a manifold, or better yet a fibre bundle, which is where a lot of physics gets done, and look at the algebra of forms on it. It has nice properties (it’s a differential graded algebra, etc.), including being commutative. One can deform these to noncommutative algebras that are quite nice - “q-deformation” assumes the commutators between elements depend on some parameter q, so the old picture where q=0 is simply a special case.

So then one thing is to develop a deformed version of classical things from geometry and analysis - for example, the Fourier transform. Even in the big purple book on quantum groups, he outlined what this approach consists of: a criterion for a quantum theory of gravity, that it should be algebraically “self-dual”, under exchange of “position” and “momentum” variables. (That is, under a Fourier transform - \mathbb{R}^n being its own Fourier dual).

Well, speaking of quantum groups, I should mention Aaron Lauda’s talk on categorifying them - specifically, on categorifying “deformed classical Lie groups”, like U_q({sl}(2)) (a q-deformed version of the universal enveloping algebra U({sl}(2)), which for q=0 is the algebra where the Lie bracket of {sl}(2) is a genuine commutator). He described a graphical calculus - a particular kind of string diagram, with some relations on them - which is a categorification of the quantum group. In fact, as sometimes happens, it categorifies a specific presentation of the algebra in terms of some generators and relations.

An appealing thing about these string diagram methods and so forth is that it suggests why these algebraic gadgets - quantum groups, in this case - are good at encoding topological information about tangles, braids, knots, and so on. If diagrams that involve those shapes categorify (read “model the underlying structure of”) quantum groups, then it makes sense that quantum groups to give invariants for them.

Along similar lines, Joao Faria Martins talked about invariants for “welded virtual knots”, and for knotted surfaces from crossed modules (read “2-groups”, if you’re so inclined - they are equivalent). Martins also published a paper with Tim Porter about related work, which in turn builds on David Yetter’s, on a class of manifold invariants. Their paper talks about “extending the Dijkgraaf-Witten model to categorical groups” (Urs Schreiber, possibly among others, rephrased that to call it a “categorification of the Dijkgraaf-Witten model”. The DW model is the TQFT foundation for my own look at extending (read, “categorifying”) TQFT’s based on gauge theory using a group G - (finite, for the DW model). These are categorifications in two different directions, though: one, from a gauge group to a gauge 2-group, the other from a TQFT - a functor - to a 2-functor given by a group. Probably for 4 dimensions and higher, the 2-group version or higher is the most interesting to study.

In fact, there was a fair bevy of talks relating to categorical methods in quantum geometry. For example, Jamie Vicary gave a talk introducing a “categorical framework for quantum algebra”, by means of non-threatening string diagrams. These can be used to show the axioms for a “\dagger-monoidal category”. Not incidentally to all this, he also shows that in finite dimensions, at least, a \mathbb{C}^{\star}-algebra is “the same thing as” a \dagger-Frobenius algebra.

Benjamin Bahr gave another talk dealing with categorical issues - namely, how to get measures on certain groupoids, such as, indeed, the groupoid of connections on a manifold. In fact, he treated various cases under the same framework: flat and non-flat connections, on manifolds and on graphs - and others.

In all, I was pleasantly surprised by the mix of the physically and mathematically inclined points of view, and the trip itself was a lot of fun.

In the past couple of weeks, Masoud Khalkhali and I have been reading and discussing this paper by Marcolli and Al-Yasry. Along the way, I’ve been explaining some things I know about bicategories, spans, cospans and cobordisms, and so on, while Masoud has been explaining to me some of the basic ideas of noncommutative geometry, and (today) K-theory and cyclic cohomology. I find the paper pretty interesting, especially with a bit of that background help to identify and understand the main points. Noncommutative geometry is fairly new to me, but a lot of the material that goes into it turns out to be familiar stuff bearing unfamiliar names, or looked at in a somewhat different way than the one I’m accustomed to. For example, as I mentioned when I went to the Groupoidfest conference, there’s a theme in NCG involving groupoids, and algebras of \mathbb{C}-linear combinations of “elements” in a groupoid. But these “elements” are actually morphisms, and this picture is commonly drawn without objects at all. I’ve mentioned before some ideas for how to deal with this (roughly: \mathbb{C} is easy to confuse with the algebra of 1 \times 1 matrices over \mathbb{C}), but anything special I have to say about that is something I’ll hide under my hat for the moment.

I must say that, though some aspects of how people talk about it, like the one I just mentioned, seem a bit off, to my mind, I like NCG in many respects. One is the way it ties in to ideas I know a bit about from the physics end of things, such as algebras of operators on Hilbert spaces. People talk about Hamiltonians, concepts of time-evolution, creation and annihilation operators, and so on in the algebras that are supposed to represent spaces. I don’t yet understand how this all fits together, but it’s definitely appealing.

Another good thing about NCG is the clever elegance of Connes’ original idea of yet another way to generalize the concept “space”. Namely, there was already a duality between spaces (in the usual sense) and commutative algebras (of functions on spaces), so generalizing to noncommutative algebras should give corresponding concepts of “spaces” which are different from all the usual ones in fairly profound ways. I’m assured, though I don’t really know how it all works, that one can do all sorts of things with these “spaces”, such as finding their volumes, defining derivatives of functions on them, and so on. They do lack some qualities traditionally associated with space - for instance, many of them don’t have many, or in some cases any, points. But then, “point” is a dubious concept to begin with, if you want a framework for physics - nobody’s ever seen one, physically, and it’s not clear to me what seeing one would consist of…

(As an aside - this is different from other versions of “pointless” topology, such as the passage from ordinary topologies to, sites in the sense of Grothendieck. The notion of “space” went through some fairly serious mutations during the 20th century: from Einstein’s two theories of relativity, to these and other mathematicians’ generalizations, the concept of “space” has turned out to be either very problematic, or wonderfully flexible. A neat book is Max Jammer’s “Concepts of Space“: though it focuses on physics and stops in the 1930’s, you get to appreciate how this concept gradually came together out of folk concepts, went through several very different stages, and in the 20th century started to be warped out of all recognition. It’s as if - to adapt Dan Dennett - “their word for milk became our word for health”.I would like to see a comparable history of mathematicians’ more various concepts, covering more of the 20th century. Plus, one could probably write a less Eurocentric genealogy nowadays than Jammer did in 1954.)

Anyway, what I’d like to say about the Marcolli and Al-Yasry paper at the moment has to do with the setup, rather than the later parts, which are also interesting. This has to do with the idea of a correspondence between noncommutative spaces. Masoud explained to me that, related to the matter of not having many points, such “spaces” also tend to be short on honest-to-goodness maps between them. Instead, it seems that people often use correspondences. Using that duality to replace spaces with algebras, a recurring idea is to think of a category where morphism from algebra A to algebra B is not a map, but a left-right (A,B)-bimodule, _AM_B. This is similar to the business of making categories of spans.

Let me describe briefly what Marcolli and Al-Yasry describe in the paper. They actually have a 2-category. It has:

Objects: An object is a copy of the 3-sphere S^3 with an embedded graph G.

Morphisms: A morphism is a span of branched covers of 3-manifolds over S^3:

G_1 \subset S^3 \stackrel{\pi_1}{\longleftarrow} M \stackrel{\pi_2}{\longrightarrow} S^3 \supset G_2

such that each of the maps \pi_i is branched over a graph containing G_i (perhaps strictly). In fact, as they point out, there’s a theorem (due to Alexander) proving that ANY 3-manifold M can be realized as a branched cover over the 3-sphere, branched at some graph (though perhaps not including a given G, and certainly not uniquely).

2-Morphisms: A 2-morphism between morphisms M_1 and M_2 (together with their \pi maps) is a cobordism M_1 \rightarrow W \leftarrow M_2, in a way that’s compatible with the structure of the $lateux M_i$ as branched covers of the 3-sphere. The M_i are being included as components of the boundary \partial W - I’m writing it this way to emphasize that a cobordism is a kind of cospan. Here, it’s a cospan between spans.

This is somewhat familiar to me, though I’d been thinking mostly about examples of cospans between cospans - in fact, thinking of both as cobordisms. From a categorical point of view, this is very similar, except that with spans you compose not by gluing along a shared boundary, but taking a fibred product over one of the objects (in this case, one of the spheres). Abstractly, these are dual - one is a pushout, and the other is a pullback - but in practice, they look quite different.

However, this higher-categorical stuff can be put aside temporarily - they get back to it later, but to start with, they just collapse all the hom-categories into hom-sets by taking morphisms to be connected components of the categories. That is, they think about taking morphisms to be cobordism classes of manifolds (in a setting where both manifolds and cobordisms have some branched-covering information hanging around that needs to be respected - they’re supposed to be morphisms, after all).

So the result is a category. Because they’re writing for noncommutative geometry people, who are happy with the word “groupoid” but not “category”, they actually call it a “semigroupoid” - but as they point out, “semigroupoid” is essentially a synonym for (small) “category”.

Apparently it’s quite common in NCG to do certain things with groupoids \mathcal{G} - like taking the groupoid algebra \mathbb{C}[\mathcal{G}] of \mathbb{C}-linear combinations of morphisms, with a product that comes from multiplying coefficients and composing morphisms whenever possible. The corresponding general thing is a categorical algebra. There are several quantum-mechanical-flavoured things that can be done with it. One is to let it act as an algebra of operators on a Hilbert space.

This is, again, a fairly standard business. The way it works is to define a Hilbert space \mathcal{H}(G) at each object G of the category, which has a basis consisting of all morphisms whose source is G. Then the algebra acts on this, since any morphism M' which can be post-composed with one M starting at G acts (by composition) to give a new morphism M' \circ M starting at G - that is, it acts on basis elements of \mathcal{H}(G) to give new ones. Extending linearly, algebra elements (combinations of morphisms) also act on \mathcal{H}(G).

So this gives, at each object G, an algebra of operators acting on a Hilbert space \mathcal{H}(G) - the main components of a noncommutative space (actually, these need to be defined by a spectral triple: the missing ingredient in this description is a special Dirac operator). Furthermore, the morphisms (which in this case are, remember, given by those spans of branched covers) give correspondences between these.

Anyway, I don’t really grasp the big picture this fits into, but reading this paper with Masoud is interesting. It ties into a number of things I’ve already thought about, but also suggests all sorts of connections with other topics and opportunities to learn some new ideas. That’s nice, because although I still have plenty of work to do getting papers written up on work already done, I was starting to feel a little bit narrowly focused.

I recently got back to London, Ontario from a trip to Ottawa, the first purpose of which was to attend the Ottawa Mathematics Conference. The other purpose was to visit family and friends, many of whom happen to be located there, which is one reason it’s taken me a week or so to get around to writing about the trip. Now, the OMC was a general-purpose conference, mainly for grad students, and some postdocs, to give short talks (plus a couple of invited faculty from Ottawa’s two universities - the University of Ottawa, and Carleton University - who gave lengthier talks in the mornings). This is not a type of conference I’ve been to before, so I wasn’t sure what to expect.

From one, fairly goal-oriented, point of view, the style of the conference seemed a little scattered. There was no particular topic of focus, for instance. On the other hand, for someone just starting out in mathematical research, this type of thing has some up sides. It gives a chance to talk about new work, see what’s being done across a range of subjects, and meet people in the region (in this case, mainly Ottawa, but also elsewhere across Eastern and Southern Ontario). The only other general-purpose mathematics conference I’ve been to so far was the joint meeting of the AMS in New Orleans in 2007, which had 5000 people and anyone attending talks would pick special sessions suiting their interests. I do think it’s worthwhile to find ways of circumventing the various pressures toward specialization in research - it may be useful in some ways, but balance is also good. Particularly for Ph.D. students, for whom specialization is the name of the game.

One useful thing - again, particularly for students - is the reminder that the world of mathematics is broader than just one’s own department, which almost certainly has its own specialties and peculiarities. For example, whereas here at UWO “Applied” mathematics (mostly involving computer modelling) is done in a separate department, this isn’t so everywhere. Or, again, while my interactions in the UWO department focus a lot on geometry and topology (there are active groups in homotopy theory and noncommutative geometry, for example), it’s been a while since I saw anyone talk about combinatorics, or differential equations. Since I actually did a major in combinatorics at U of Waterloo, it was kind of refreshing to see some of that material again.

There were a couple of invited talks by faculty. Monica Nevins from U of Ottawa gave a broad and enthusiastic survey of representation theory for graduate students. Brett Stevens from Carleton talked about “software testing”, which surprised me by actually being about combinatorial designs. Basically, it’s about the problem of how, if you have many variables with many possible values each, to design a minimal collection of “settings” for those variables which tests all possible combinations of, say, two variables (or three, etc.). One imagines the variables representing circumstances software might have to cope with - combinations of inputs, peripherals, and so on - so the combinatorial problem is if there are 10 variables with 10 possible values each, you can’t possibly test all 10 billion combinations - but you might be able to test all possible settings of any given PAIR of variables, and much more efficiently than just an exhaustive search, by combining some tests together.

Among the other talks were several combinatorial ones - error correcting codes using groups, path ideals in simplicial trees (which I understand to be a sort of generalization to simplicial sets of what trees are for graphs), heuristic algorithms for finding minimal cost collections of edges in weighted graphs that leave the graph with at least a given connectivity, and so on. Charles Starling from U of O gave an interesting talk about how to associate a topological space to an aperiodic tiling (roughly, any finite-size region in an aperiodic tiling is repeated infinitely many times - so the points of the space are translations, and two translations are within \epsilon of one another if they produce matching regions about the origin of size \frac{1}{\epsilon} - then the thing is to study cohomology of such spaces, and so forth).

The talk immediately following mine was by Mehmetcik Pamuk about homotopy self-equivalences of 4-manifolds, which used a certain braid of exact sequences of groups of automorphisms (among other things). I expected this to be very interesting, and it was certainly intriguing, but I can’t adequately summarize it - whatever he was saying, it proved to be hard to pick up from just a 25 minute talk. I did like something he said in his introduction, though: nowadays, if a topologist says they’re doing “low-dimensional” topology, they mean dimension 3, and “high-dimensional” means dimension 4. This is a glib but indicative way to point out that topology of manifolds in dimensions 1 and 2 is well understood (the connected components are, respectively, circles and n-holed tori), and in dimension 5 and above have been straightened out more recently thanks to Smale.

There were some quite applied talks which I missed, though I did catch one on “gravity waves”, which turn out not to be gravitational waves, but the kind of waves produced in fluids of varying density acted on by gravity. (In particular, due to layers of temperature and pressure in the atmosphere, sometimes denser air sits above less dense air, and gravity is trying to reverse this, producing waves. This produces those long rippling patterns you sometimes see in high-altitude clouds. Lidia Nikitina told us about some work modelling these in situations where the ground topography matters, such as near mountains - and had some really nice pictures to illustrate both the theory and the practice.)

On the second day there were quite a few talks of an algebraic or algebra-geometric flavour - about rings of algebraic invariants, about enumerating lines in special “blow-up” varieties, function fields associated to hyperelliptic curves, and so on - but although this is interesting, I had a harder time extracting informative things to say about these, so I’ll gloss over them glibly. However, I did appreciate the chance to gradually absorb a little more of this area of math by osmosis.

The flip side of seeing what many other people are doing was getting a chance to see what other people had to say about my own talk - about groupoids, spans, and 2-vector spaces. One of the things I find is that, while here at UWO the language of category theory is widely used (at least by the homotopy theorists and noncommutative geometry people I’ve been talking to), it’s not as familiar in other places. This seems to have been going on for some time - since the 1970’s if I understand the stories correctly. After MacLane and Eilenberg introduced categories in the 1940’s, the concept had significant effects in algebraic geometry/topology, homological algebra, and spread out from there. There was some deep enthusiasm - possibly well-founded, though I won’t claim so - that category theory was a viable replacement for set theory as a “foundation” for mathematics. True or not, that idea seemed to be one of those which was picked up by mathematicans who didn’t otherwise know much about category theory, and it seems to be one that’s still remembered. So maybe it had something to do with the apparent fall from fashion of category theory. I’ve heard that theory suggested before: roughly, that many mathematicians thought category theory was supposed to be a new foundation for mathematics, couldn’t see the point, and lost interest.

Now, my view of foundations is roughly suggested in my explanation of the title of this blog. I tend to think that our understanding of the world comes in bits and pieces, which we refine, then try to stick together into larger and more inclusive bits and pieces - the “Atlas” of charts of the title. This isn’t really just about the physical world, but the mathematical world as well (in fact I’m not really a Platonist who believes in a separate “world” of mathematical objects - though that’s a different conversation). This is really just a view of epistemology - namely, empirical methods work best because we don’t know things for sure, not being infinitely smart. So the “idealist”-style program of coming up with some foundational axioms (say, for set theory), and deriving all of mathematics from them without further reference to the outside doesn’t seem like the end of the story. It’s useful as a way of generating predictions in physics, but not of testing them. In mathematics, it generates many correct theorems, but doesn’t help identify interesting, or useful, ones.

So could category theory be used in foundations of mathematics? Maybe - but you could also say that mathematics consists of manipulating strings in a formal language, and strings are just words in a free monoid, so actually all of mathematics is the theory of monoids with some extra structure (giving rules of inference in the formal language). Yet monoid theory - indeed, algebra generally - is not mainly interesting as foundations, and probably neither is category theory.

On the whole, it was an interesting step out of the usual routine.

First, the obligatory excuse found in most sporadic blogs: I haven’t taken the time to write anything here recently. I was busy for a while, between the trip to UC Davis to speak (giving a form of this talk) at the “Strings and Gravity” seminar there, and then catching up on teaching - the end of the term is coming up. There: now that’s out of the way.

Right now I want to say something a bit broader than I have been doing - somewhere between “intuitive justification” and “philosophy”. The motivation is that whenever I talk about ETQFT’s and how to see them as introducing matter into quantum gravity, there’s always some puzzlement about this “categorification” business. To people who think a lot about category theory, it may seem natural, but many of those interested in physical questions don’t fall in this category, and the whole idea of “categorifying” a theory seems like a weird, arbitrary imposition.

So talking to these different audiences has forced me to think about how to give an intuitive account of why this might be a good idea. Ideally this will not be so precise as to be incomprehensible, or so vague as to be useless. In reality, this will be at best a rough sketch of such a justification.

Stuff, Structure, and Properties

One aspect of the relationship which I wanted to comment on, one that almost seems like a pun, is the trichotomy which John Baez and Jim Dolan like to use in describing mathematical, um, widgets (I would use the more standard term “objects”, or maybe “structures”, but both of these words have technical meanings in the following) in categorical terms. This is the distinction between “stuff”, “structure”, and “properties”. (More details here and via subsequent links - some of which shows up in my first paper). Almost any usual mathematical widget can be broken down this way: (1) they consist of some “stuff”, often in the form of some sets; (2) the stuff is equipped with “structure”, often described by some functions; (3) the structure satisfies some “properties”, often expressed as equations.

For example: a group is (1) a set G of elements, equipped with (2) a group operation (expressed as a function m : G \times G \rightarrow G), and a special identity element (picked out by a function from the one-element set, 1 : \star \rightarrow G), and an inverse for each element (given by an inverse function inv : G \rightarrow G. These satisfy (3) the group axioms, which are some equations involving expressing some properties - associativity, the properties of 1 and inverses.

In this case, the structure live inside the category of sets and functions - but similar things could be said in any other category. For instance, in the category of topological spaces and continuous functions, the same setup gives the definition of a topological group, likewise divided into “stuff” (objects, in this case topological spaces), “structure” (some morphisms), and “properties” (equations between morphisms).

Widgets which live in an n-category of some kind have more of these layers - such a widget will be specified by one or more objects, equipped with specified morphisms and 2-morphisms, satisfying some equations. A monoidal category, for instance, is this kind of widget: it has a category worth of “elements”, equipped with a monoidal operation given as a functor, equipped in turn with specified 2-isomorphisms such as the “associator”, which satisfies some equations such as the Pentagon identity. There are now FOUR levels to specify. I think it was Jim Dolan who came up with the following way of extending the “stuff/structure/properties” terminology (his explanation).

The highest level - equations - always deserves the name “properties”, since they either hold, or don’t (at least, there’s a truth value associated to them - but let’s not worry about multiple-valued logics). By analogy, this suggests the data for our widget given by the n-morphisms in the n-category where it lives should be called “structure”. The (n-1)-morphisms (which are the objects in a 1-category) should be called “stuff”.

For the (n-2), (n-3), and generally k-morphisms, Jim introduces the prefix “eka”, as in “eka-stuff”, which follows Mendeleev’s nomenclature for elements predicted by his form of the periodic table of elements which were heavier than known ones. This nomenclature in turn comes from the Sanskrit “eka”, meaning “one” - the new elements were one level lower on the periodic table.

So specifying a widget in a 2-category involves “eka-stuff/stuff/structure/properties”. This is suggestive, in that it seems as if categorification - adding a new level - is like digging out a new sub-basement beneath a house. First “eka-stuff”, then “eka-eka-stuff”, and so on, to “ekak-stuff”. Since, in many versions of n-category, given two objects x and y, the totality of morphisms hom(x,y) form an (n-1)-category, this is somewhat correct: there is an (n-1)-categorical structure describing each hom(x,y).

(The periodic-table analogy, I suppose, is meant to imply that the best-understood layer is the layer of equations - which describe properties. This opposes what is probably the more common intuition people have when first encountering higher categories, that we know what “objects” are, but find “higher morphisms” confusing. But when writing things concretely, it’s the highest-level morphisms which look most familiar, like functions.)

A key point here is that “stuff having structure satisfying properties” is a fairly intuitive framework for talking about things. Categorification gives us a more nuanced layering. It may seem odd to speak of “eka-stuff equipped with stuff equipped with structure satisfying properties” (even worse if you want to be consistent, and say “equipped with” instead of “satisfying”). But now the second layer - stuff, refers to 1-morphisms. Here is a layer which has some aspects we associate with “structure”: it describes relations between the eka-stuff (objects). On the other hand, it also has aspects we associate with “stuff” (it can be equipped with its own structure). When would one want something that is on the one hand something like a relational attribute between things (structure), and on the other hand something like an object in its own right (stuff).

One answer: to describe space. As a good Leibnizian, I prefer to think of space relationally: it describes how objects are situated in terms of structural relationships. On the other hand, General Relativity tells us that if we think about space, rather than spacetime, we need to describe it as having dynamics which satisfy some property. From this point of view, space is like material stuff that changes over time, according to some differential equation (classically, at least).

Matter = Stuff?

Now, part of the point of applying extended TQFT ideas to gravity is that the categorification introduces matter into the formerly empty background of topological gravity - in particular, the state of a bit matter is described by looking at the boundary conditions on a codimension-2 surface in spacetime (or codimension-1 surface in space) surrounding it. The “pun” I alluded to above is the idea that introducing matter amounts to introducing a new layer of “stuff”. Adding matter means adding “stuff”…

The pun isn’t quite dead on, however, because in the ETQFT setup, adding matter is actually adding “eka-stuff”: digging out a sub-basement on which the “stuff” of geometrized space and its dynamics can rest.

So how does the periodic table of stuff/structure/properties relate to an extended TQFT? To start with, consider the case of an ordinary TQFT in 2 dimensions. It’s well known that such TQFT’s correspond to commutative Frobenius algebras (though see e.g. this paper by Aaron Lauda and Hendryk Pfeiffer, where they explain this, and a generalization of it). That is, a TQFT defines an object with (1) Stuff: a vector space, equipped with (2) Structure: unit, counit, multiplication, and comultiplication maps, satisfying (3) Properties: a bunch of axioms, including the Frobenius relation, commutativity, and algebra axioms like associativity.

The key thing is that this correspondence comes from the fact that a 2D TQFT is a functor into \mathbf{Vect} from the category \mathbf{2Cob}, which happens to be a symmetric monoidal category freely generated by one object (the circle), and some morphisms (corresponding to four cobordisms: the cap, cup, “pair of pants”, and “inverted pair of pants”), subject to just the topological relations making the circle with these maps into a “Frobenius object”. (Since the cobordisms are only defined up to diffeomorphism).

Then any actual “physical” setting will look like: a bunch of circles, say n of them, connected to another bunch of circles, say m of them, by some cobordism. We could call this a “string world sheet” (although not in the sense of string theory, exactly, since over there one typically has conformal structure on the cobordisms too, and talks about a CFT, not a TQFT, living on the sheet). In general, the cobordism will be an n+m-punctured, genus-g torus (with orientations that distinguish the n inputs from the m outputs). So if the dynamics of the “physical” world are described by a TQFT corresponding to Frobenius algebra F, this topology will mean the space of states of the world is given by F^{\otimes n} at the beginning and F^{\otimes m} at the end (this is “stuff”). A state evolves through “time” by the morphism (”structure”) corresponding to the cobordism C - a particular combination of multiplication and comultiplication maps for the

In a theory of gravity without matter, we can see three levels as well - “slices” of space with some geometric information, connected by spacetimes with geometric information, which satisfy some equations. In particular, the geometric information on spacetime has to satisfy Einstein’s equation, if we’re talking about the classical world, or some sort of Hamiltonian constraint in (some approaches to) quantum gravity. In any case, it must have some property to be admissible. So this suggests the classifications: “space geometry” - stuff; “spacetime geometry” - structure; “dynamical laws” - properties.

Categorification suggests adding to this list: “matter/boundary conditions” - eka-stuff. That is, the eka-stuff in a specific physical setting will be a “2-space of states” for matter as measured at a particular boundary. In a 3D ETQFT, for instance, the boundaries to space will be unions of circles (just as in a 2D TQFT), so this will be generated by a 2-space of states for a circle. The circle could be thought of as the boundary around a single excised particle, but in fact that only covers the irreducible 2-states: in general, it’s a boundary around some region containing a system. Space geometry relates such boundaries to each other: it is “stuff” relating the “eka-stuff”. That stuff (space geometry), in turn, can be equipped with structure - maps associated to a spacetime topology, which describe how it evolves in “time” (though a-priori there’s no special time direction - the “stuff” could equally well describe the world-sheet of the system boundary, and the structure describing how that evolution extends outward spatially).

It seems to me there’s a lot here, but to really say it properly would require being much more technically precise than I’m up to at the moment. So that’s about all I have to say about that.

I’m going to be giving a talk on extended TQFT stuff and quantum gravity at Perimeter Institute next thursday, and then in mid-March I’ll be heading to UC Davis to give the same/similar talk for the String Theory and Quantum Gravity seminar being run by Derek Wise. So I have a bunch of things on my mind right now. However, before heading to Davis, I wanted to go back and look at some of the stuff Derek has done having to do with Cartan geometry, which I was following somewhat at the time, and blog about it a bit here. Before that, I’d like to wrap up this presentation of the talks I gave here about representation theory of the Poincaré 2-group, \mathbf{Poinc}.

As a side note, thanks to Dan for pointing out these notes on representations of the (normal, uncategorified) Poincaré group, including some general comments on representations of semidirect products. It’s interesting to consider how this relates to the more general picture of 2-group representations - but I won’t do so here and now.

In Part 1 I talked about what representations 2-categories of 2-groups are like in general, and in Part 2 a fairly concrete description of \mathbf{Poinc}. Here I’ll wrap up by summarizing the results of Crane and Sheppeard about what Rep(\mathbf{Poinc}) looks like concretely.

It has three parts: the objects are representations (also known as functors from \mathbf{Poinc} as a 2-category with one object, into \mathbf{Meas}); the morphisms are 1-intertwiners (a.k.a. natural transformations) between reps; and the 2-morphisms are 2-intertwiners (a.k.a. modifications) between 1-intertwiners.

1) Representations: A functor

\mathbf{Poinc} \rightarrow \mathbf{Meas}

will pick out some measurable space X = F(\star) for the lone object of the 2-group - or rather, Meas(X), the 2-vector space of all measurable fields of Hilbert spaces on X. (This is a matter of taste since to know the one is to know the other.) Then for the morphisms and 2-morphisms of \mathbf{Poinc} we get, respectively, 2-linear maps from Meas(X) to itself, and natural transformations between them.

The morphisms of \mathbf{Poinc} are just the group G in the crossed-module picture I described in Part 2. For the usual Poincaré 2-group, this is SO(p,q). For each such element, we’re supposed to get an invertible 2-linear map from Meas(X) to itself - that is, a measurable field of Hilbert spaces on X \times X (together with measures to do “matrix multiplication” with by direct integrals). This can only be invertible if the only Hilbert spaces which appear are 1-dimensional (since these maps compose by a “matrix multiplication” involving direct sums of tensor products of the components - and the discreteness of dimensions means that if any dimension is higher than 1, you’ll never get back the identity).

So any representation turns out to give what amounts to an action of SO(p,q) on X - the component F(g)(x_1,x_2) is \mathbb{C} if x_2 = g \triangleright x_1 and 0 otherwise. An irreducible representation gives an X with a transitive action (otherwise, you can decompose it into orbits, each of which corresponds to a subrepresentation). Crane and Sheppeard classify several kinds of these, associated to various subgroups of SO(p,q), but an easy example would be a mass shell in Minkowski space - a sphere or hyperboloid (depending on (p,q)) that is the full orbit of some point under rotations and boosts (a “mass shell” because it gives all the possible momenta for a particle of a given mass, as seen by an observer in some inertial frame).

The 2-morphism part of \mathbf{Poinc} gives a homomorphism from \mathbb{R}^{p+q} \rightarrow Mat_1(\mathbb{C}) at each of these points. Now, one-by-one matrices of complex numbers are just complex numbers, so what we have here is a character of \mathbb{R}^{p+q} - at each point on X. To be functorial, this has to be done in an equivariant way (so that acting on the point x \in X by g \in SO(p,q) affects the character by acting on \mathbb{R}^{p+q} by the same g).

2) 1-Intertwiners:

If representations F and F' correspond to actions of SO(p,q) on spaces X and X' respectively, with characters h, h', then what is a 1-intertwiner \phi : F \rightarrow F'? Remember from Part 1 that it’s a natural transformation: to the object \star of \mathbf{Poinc} it assigns a specific 2-linear map

\phi(\star) : F(\star) \rightarrow F'(\star)

To each g \in SO(p,q) (object of \mathbf{Poinc}) it gives a transformation

\phi(g) : \phi(\star) \circ F(g) \rightarrow F'(g) \circ \phi(\star)

This is a specified map which replaces the naturality square in the old definition of an intertwiner. It has to make a certain “pillow” diagram commute (Part 1).

Now, back in the posts on 2-Hilbert spaces, I explained that a 2-linear map \phi(\star) is given by some field of Hilbert spaces \mathcal{K} on X \times X' (a “matrix” of Hilbert spaces, though of course X, X' needn’t be finite), along with a family of measures on X indexed by X' (which allow us to do integration when doing the sum in “matrix multiplication”). The transformations \phi(g) also can be written in components, so that

\phi(g)_{(x,y)} : \mathcal{K}_{(F(g)^{-1}(x),y)}\rightarrow \mathcal{K}_{(x,F'(g)(y))}

(Note this uses the two actions given by F,F' on X,X' - one forward, and one backward. This is the current form of what, in uncategorified representation theory, would be a naturality condition.)

What does this all amount to? One way to think of it is as a representation of SO(p,q) \ltimes R^{p+q} itself! In particular, it’s a representation on the direct sum of all the Hilbert spaces which appear as components of \phi(\star). This is since the maps given by the \phi(g) have to satisfy a condition which says that composition is preserved (as long as you’re careful about indexing things):

\phi(gg')_{(x,y)} = \phi(g)_{F(g')x,G(g')y)} \circ \phi(g')_{(x,y)}

To get a representation of the group, we can say that elements (g,h) \in G shuffle vector spaces over points in X by the action of g and then act within vector spaces by h. So then \phi has both intertwiner-like and representation-like properties.

The “intertwiner-ness” of \phi has to do with how it interpolates between two actions on X,X' by turning them into an action on the product X \times X' - but it also has some “representation-ness”, by giving this action of a (semidirect product) group on a big vector space.

3) 2-intertwiners

If a 1-intertwiner can be thought of as a representation of G \ltimes H, it shouldn’t be too surprising that a 2-intertwiner between 1-intertwiners \phi, \phi' ends up being an intertwiner between the associated representations. If 1-intertwiners have some qualities of both reps and intertwiners, the 2-intertwiners are more single-minded.

In particular, a 2-intertwiner m : \phi \rightarrow \phi' assigns to the only object of \mathbf{Poinc} a 2-morphism in \mathbf{2Vect} (that is, a field of linear maps between the vector spaces which are the components of \phi, \phi'), which satisfies some “pillow” diagram. When we form the big rep. by taking a direct integral of all those spaces, the field of linear maps turns into one big linear map, and the diagram it satisfies just collapses into the condition that it be an intertwiner.

So the representation theory of this interesting 2-group looks a lot like the representation theory of the group of 2-morphisms. The extra structure involving actions on measurable spaces by G = SO(p,q) would be mostly invisible if you just thought about irreducible reps of the group, since the space would be just a single point.

This phenomenon where a lower-order structure turns up in some form at the top level of morphisms of its categorified version has cropped up before in this blog - namely, when extended TQFT’s turn out to contain normal TQFT’s in individual components. In these examples, categorification is less a matter of building more floors “on top” of structures we already know, as “higher morphisms” suggests, but excavating additional floors of subbasement - interpreting what were objects as morphisms.

It’s been a while since I wrote the last entry, on representation theory of n-groups, partly because I’ve been polishing up a draft of a paper on a different subject. Now that I have it at a plateau where other people are looking at it, I’ll carry on with a more or less concrete description of the situation of a 2-group. For higher values of n, describing things concretely would get very elaborate quite quickly, but interesting things already happen for n=2. In particular, the case that I gave the talk about, a while back, was mostly the Poincaré 2-group, since this is the one Crane, Sheppeard, and Yetter talk about, and probably the one most interesting to physicists.  It was first described by John Baez.

So what’s the Poincaré 2-group? To begin with, what’s a 2-group again?

I already said that a 2-group \mathbb{G} is a 2-category with only one object, and all morphisms and 2-morphisms invertible. That’s all very good for summing up the representation theory of \mathbb{G} as I described last time, but it’s sometimes more informative to describe the structure of \mathbb{G} concretely. A good tool for doing this is a crossed module. (A lot more on 2-groups can be found in Baez and Lauda’s HDA V, and there are some more references and information in this page by Ronald Brown, who’s done a lot to popularize crossed modules).

A crossed module has two layers, which correspond to the morphisms and 2-morphisms of \mathbb{G}. These can be represented as (G,H,\triangleright, \partial), where G is the group of morphisms in \mathbb{G}, H consists of the 2-morphisms ending at the identity of G (a group under horizontal composition).

There has to be an action \triangleright : G \rightarrow End(H) of G on H (morphisms can be composed “horizontally” with 2-morphisms), and a map \partial : H \rightarrow G (which picks out the source of the 2-morphism). The data (G,H,\triangleright,\partial) have to fit together a certain way, which amounts to giving the axioms for a 2-category.

A handy way to remember the conditions is to realize that the action \triangleright : G \rightarrow End(H) and the injection \partial : H \rightarrow G give ways for elements of G to act on each other and for elements of H to act on each other. These amount to doing first \triangleright and then \partial or vice versa, and both of these must amount to conjugation. That is:

\partial(g \triangleright h) = g (\partial h) g^{-1}

and

(\partial h_1) \triangleright h_2 = h_1 h_2 h_2^{-1}

Both of these are simplified in the case that \partial maps everything in H to the identity of G - in this case, H can be interpreted as the group of 2-automorphisms of the identity 1-morphism of the sole object of \mathbb{G}. In this case, by the Eckmann-Hilton argument (the clearest explanation of which that I know being the one in TWF Week 100) it turns out that H has to be commutative, so the first condition is trivial since \partial h = 1, and the second is trivial since it follows from commutativity. This simpler situation is known as an automorphic 2-group.

In any case, given a 2-group represented as a crossed module, automorphic or not, the collection of all morphisms can be seen as a group in itself - namely the semidirect product G \ltimes H, which is to say G \times H with the multiplication (g_1,h_1) \cdot (g_2,h_2) = (g_1 g_2 , g_2 \triangleright h_1 h_2). “What?” you may ask, or maybe “Why?”

Maybe a concrete example would help, since we’d like one anyway: the Poincaré 2-group, which is an automorphic 2-group. There are versions of various signatures (p,q), in which case G = SO(p,q), and H = \mathbb{R}^{p+q}.

The group G, then, consists of metric-preserving transformations of Minkowski space R^{p+q} with the metric of signature (p,q) - rotations and boosts (if any). The (abelian) group H consists of translations of this space - in fact, being a vector space, it’s just a copy of it. Between them, they cover the basic types of transformation. Thinking of the translations as having a “projection” down to the identity rotation/boost may seem a bit artificial, except insofar as translations “don’t rotate” anything. More obvious is that rotations or boosts act on translations: the same translation can look differently in rotated/boosted coordinate systems - that is, to different observers.

So where does the Poincaré group SO(p,q) \ltimes \mathbb{R}^{p+q} come in? It’s the group of all metric-preserving transformations of Minkowski space, and is built from these two types: but how?

Well, the vector space H = \mathbb{R}^{p+q} is the group of transformations of the identity Lorentz transformation 1 \in G = SO(p,q), since the map \partial : H \rightarrow G is trivial. But suppose that there is another copy of H over each point in G. Then we have the set of points G \times H, but notice that to talk about this as a group, we’d want a way to act on an element h_1 of one copy of H over g_1 \in G by another h_2 over g_2. The obvious way is to just treat the whole set as a product of groups, but this misses the fundamental relation between G and H, which is that G can act on H, just as morphisms can act on 2-morphisms by “whiskering with the identity”. (Via Google books, here is the description of this in MacLane’s Categories for the Working Mathematician).

Concretely, this is the fact that there is a sensible way for both parts of (g_1,h_1) to affect the h_2, so we can say (g_2,h_2) \cdot (g_1,h_1) = (g_2 g_1, g_1 h_2 + h_1) (using additive notation for translations, since they’re abelian). The point is that the first rotation we do, g_1, changes coordinates, and therefore the definition of the translation h_2.

So that’s the construction of the Poincaré group from the Poincaré 2-group. What would be nice would be to have some clear description of some higher analog of Minkowski space where it makes sense to say the Poincaré 2-group acts as a 2-group. I don’t quite know how to set this up, but if anyone has thoughts, it would be interesting to hear them.

One reason is that, when describing representations of the 2-group, there’s an important role for spaces (or at least sets) with an action of the group G - which raises questions like whether there’s a role for 2-spaces with 2-group actions in representation theory of higher n-groups. Again - I don’t really know the answer to this. However, in Part 3 I’ll describe concretely how this works for 2-groups, and particularly the Poincaré 2-group.

Recently I finished up my series of talks on 2-Hilbert spaces with a description of the basics of 2-group representation theory, and a little about the special case of the Poincaré 2-group. The main sources were a paper by Crane and Yetter describing 2-group representations in general, and another by Crane and Sheppeard. The Poincaré 2-group, so far as I know, was first explicitly mentioned by John Baez in the context of higher gauge theory. It’s an example of a kind of 2-group which can be cooked up from any group G and abelian group H, and which is related to the semidirect product G \ltimes H.

One reason people are starting to take an interest in the representation theory of the Poincaré 2-group is that representations of the Poincaré group (among others) and intertwiners between them play a role in spin foam models for field theories such as BF theory, various models of quantum gravity, and so on. Some of these, turn up naturally when looking at TQFT’s, and generalizations of these, which is how I got here. Extending this to 2-groups gives a richer structure to work with. (Whether the extra richness is useful is another matter).

Before getting into more detail, I first would like to take a look at representation theory for groups from a categorical point of view, and then see what happens when we move to n-groups - that is, when we categorify.

To begin with, we can think of a representation (V, \rho) of a group G as a functor. The group G can be thought of as a category with one object and all morphisms invertible - so that the group elements are morphisms, and the group operation is composition. In this case, a representation of the group is just any functor:

\rho : G \rightarrow Vect

since this assigns some one vector space (the representation space, \rho(\star) = V) to the one object of G, and a linear map \rho(g):  V \rightarrow V to each morphism of G (i.e. to each group element) in a way consistent with composition. The nice thing about this point of view is that knowing a little category theory is enough to suggest one of the fundamental ideas of representation theory, namely intertwining operators (”intertwiners”). These are natural transformations between functors. This is the idea to categorify.

The point is that functors F : G \rightarrow Vect can be organized into a structure hom(G,Vect), and this is most naturally seen as a category, not just a set. The category of representations of G is usually called Rep(G), but seen as a category of functors, it is a general case of a category $hom(C,D)$ of functors from category C to category D. Let’s look at how this is structured, then consider what happens with higher dimensional categories. There seems to be a general pattern which one can just begin to see with 1-categories:

  • a functor F : C \rightarrow D is a map between categories, assigning
    • to each C-object a corresponding D-object
    • to each C-morphism a corresponding D-morphism

    in a way compatible with composition and identities

  • a natural transformation n between functors F,F' : C \rightarrow D assigns
    • to each C-object a D-morphism

    making a naturality square commute for any morphism g : x \rightarrow y in C:

Naturality Square

(In the case where the functors are representations of a group, this is an intertwiner - a linear map which commutes with the action of the group on V.)

The pattern is a little more obvious for 2-categories:

  • a 2-functor F : C \rightarrow D is a map between 2-categories, assigning
    • to each C-object a corresponding D-object
    • to each C-morphism a corresponding D-morphism
    • to each C-2-morphism a corresponding D-2-morphism

    in a way compatible with composition and identities

  • a natural transformation n between 2-functors F,F' : C \rightarrow D assigns
    • to each C-object a D-morphism
    • to each C-morphism a D-2-morphism

    making a generalized naturality square commute for any 2-morphism h : f \rightarrow g in C (where f,g : x \rightarrow y):

2-Naturality Diagram
  • a modification (what I might have named a “2-natural transformation” or similar) m between natural transformations n,n' : F \rightarrow n' assigns
    • to each C-object a D-2-morphism

    making a similar diagram commute (OK, well, it appears on p11 of John Baez’ Introduction to n-Categories, but I don’t have a web-ified version of it - I haven’t learned how to turn LaTeX diagrams into handy web format).

In the case where C = G is a 2-group - a 2-category with one object and all j-morphisms invertible, and D = 2Vect, then we have here the (quite abstract!) definition of a representation, an 1-intertwiner between representations, and a 2-intertwiner between 1-intertwiners.

It’s not too hard to see the pattern suggested here - a “k-natural transformation” assigns a k-morphism in D to an object in the n-category C, and a (k+j)-morphism in D to each j-morphism in C. This morphism fits into a diagram filling a commutative diagram which was the coherence law for the top dimensional transformation for (n-1)-categories. (I might point out that if I were to come up with terminology for these things from scratch, I’d try to build in some flexibility from the start. Instead of “functor”, “natural transformation”, and “modification”, I’d have used terms more analogous to the terminology for morphisms. Probably I’d have used, respectively, “1-functor”, “2-functor”, “3-functor”, and so on. This is already a problem, since these terms are in use with a different meaning! Instead, I’ve used “natural k-transformation”.) It’s less easy to say what, explicitly, the various coherence laws should be at each stage, except that there should be an equation between the composites of (a) the n-morphisms in an n-natural transformation with (b) the two possible images of any chosen lower dimensional morphisms.

There is a lot of useful information out there about various forms of n-categories, such as the Illustrated Guidebook by Cheng and Lauda, and Tom Leinster’s “Higher Operads, Higher Categories” (also in print). They’re a little less packed with information on functors, natural transformations, and their higher generalizations. I don’t know a reference that explains the generalization thoroughly, though. If anyone does know a good source on this, I’d like to hear about it. Probably this is somewhere in the work of Street, Kelly, maybe Batanin (whose definition of n-category is the one implicitly used here) or others, but I’m not familiar enough with the literature to know where this is done.

These generalizations of functors and natural transformations to higher n-categories describe what functor n-categories are like. When written down and decoded, these definitions can be turned into a concrete definition of representations and the various k-intertwiners involved in the representation theory of n-groups.

However, next time I’ll take a look at some of what is known in the slightly more down to earth world where n=2.

So I gave a little talk shortly before leaving London for Christmas. I had mostly written it up, but then I’ve been on the road for a while in Montreal, Ottawa, and Calgary, without consistent net access. However, now I have a moment to put this up.

The talk carried on from the previous one I described last post. It began to move in the direction of representation theory of 2-groups on 2-vector spaces and 2-Hilbert spaces, but didn’t get that far. This was partly because I had to finish describing what 2-linear maps and 2-maps look like for such spaces, and then because I had to explain about 2-groups and give some examples. I’ll say more about the representation-theory stuff in January. But here I’ll just summarize at least the rest of the description of the category Meas, and also 2Hilb by describing 2-linear maps and so forth. Then I’ll comment a little more philosophically about what these are about.

So I explain how there’s a 2-vector space (in some suitable sense, not the KV sense) of measurable fields of Hilbert spaces on a space X, analogous to the vector space of complex functions on a space. Also similarly, given a measure on X, we get an inner product. Then there’s a (2-)Hilbert space where this inner product is always well-defined (as a complex scalar, or a genuine Hilbert space - which is the equivalent of a scalar at the next level up).

Well, then Crane and Yetter’s paper describes constructively how to get 2-linear maps (additive, linear functors) between such 2-vector spaces. They don’t as far as I can see, show that all functors arise this way, but it seems likely. The way is to say you get a functor T: Meas(X) \rightarrow Meas(Y) from:

1) A measurable field of Hilbert spaces T \in Meas(X \times Y) (this is similar to the linear maps between KV 2-vector spaces, which are like matrices of vector spaces)

2) A Y-indexed family of measures d \mu_y (x) on X - these give you the measures you need to do the “inner product” involved in “matrix multiplication” at each y \in Y (note that this stuff is only well-defined up to sets of measure 0, as usual). So we have, on objects:

(T \mathcal{H})_y = \int^{\oplus}_X d \mu_y(x) T_{(x,y)} \otimes \mathcal{H}_x

and a related expression for morphisms, using the identity on T_{(x,y)}.

It’s probably worth pointing out that the measures on X are used in the direct integral here, and so their only real role is to define the inner product on (T\mathcal{H})_y - the underlying vector space at each point in the new field would be the same no matter what these measures were (up to the fact that if the resulting inner product is degenerate, we need a quotient space where it’s not).

So this gives 2-linear maps, which are functors. Natural transformation between these functors come from the fact that Meas(X \times Y) is itself a category, and in fact a 2-vector space in the sense we’re using here (Meas is “enriched over itself”). So morphisms between these fields of Hilbert spaces basically amount to fields of bounded operators as usual. This is actually not quite right, because we need to account for the different measures: basically, you use a measure which is the geometric mean of those associated to source and target - check out Crane and Yetter’s paper if you want the details.

That finishes up a summary of how 2-Hilbert spaces work. The next thing I’ll be talking to our group about is how to use these for a categorified form of representation theory.

But first, what is the point of all this stuff? Not yet asking about representation theory in this setting - why is it interesting enough to bother? It’s worth thinking about what a categorification of a Hilbert space is supposed to be. In particular, let’s try locating them in the world of quantum mechanics.

A quantum system is usally portrayed as having states represented by vectors in a Hilbert space. The only things you can “do” to states involve applying operators to the whole space: project them into subspaces, “rotating” them by some unitary evolution operator, and so on. In a 2-Hilbert space, states, or “2-vectors” are objects in a category, which means there are not only these “macro” operations on the whole space, but also morphisms between any two states you pick. In fact, this is the source of the inner product on a 2-Hilbert space - there is a Hilbert space (in the usual sense) of morphisms between any two states, and in the world of 2-Hilbert spaces, this is the equivalent of a scalar.

In QM, the inner product \langle x , y \rangle is telling you an amplitude to observe a system in state y if it was set up in state x - this is saying something about “how related” x is to y. The categorifed picture saying this is just hom(x,y) makes more explicit what kind of relationship this is.

Now, if you happen to pick the same vector to start and end with, considering